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Research from psychology, neurobiology and behavioral economics indicates that a
binary view of motivation, based on approach and avoidance, may be too reductive.
Instead, a literature review suggests that at least seven distinct motives are likely to affect
human decisions: “consumption/resource seeking,” “care,” “affiliation,” “achievement,”
“status-power,” “threat approach” (or anger), and “threat avoidance” (or fear). To explore
the conceptual distinctness and relatedness of these motives, we conducted a semantic
categorization task. Here, participants were to assign provided words to one of the
motives. By applying principal component analysis to the categorization assignments
we represent the semantic inter-relations of these motives on a two-dimensional space,
a “semantic atlas.” This atlas suggests that, while care and affiliation are conceptually
close, affiliation is closer to threat avoidance (or fear); opposite to these motives we find
achievement, consumption and power, with the latter lying closer to threat approach (or
anger). In a second study, we asked participants to rate how well the motive-specific
words obtained in the first study described their currently experienced feelings. We find
that semantically close motives are also more likely to be experienced together, that is,
we replicate most of the semantic relations in the “subjective atlas.” We discuss our
findings in comparison to other multi-dimensional models of motivation, which show
clear similarities. In addition to these motivational atlases, we provide a database of
motive-specific words, together with the valence and arousal scores. These can be used
for future research on the influence of motives on decision making.
Keywords: affiliation, care, motives, motivation psychology, semantic categorization, economic decision making
INTRODUCTION
Standard economic theory is typically agnostic with regards to the types of goals that agents
generally pursue and assumes that agents are systematically driven only by stable preferences
(Samuelson, 1938; Stigler and Becker, 1977). In contrast, decades of psychological research have
suggested that many decisions are driven by particular motives, such as the motivation for
achievement, power or affiliation (Thorndike, 1898; McDougall, 1932; Lewin, 1935; McClelland
et al., 1953; Mowrer, 1960; Deci and Moller, 2005; Heckhausen and Heckhausen, 2010). In line
with this, natural languages present a highly rich and structured vocabulary ofmotive-related words
(Talevich et al., 2017). Thesemotives are typically conceived both as trait-related dispositions and as
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context-sensitive states that lead subjects to experience particular
types of incentives as pleasurable and rewarding, to strive for
certain types of goals, and hence to activate particular behavioral
tendencies and related decisions (Atkinson, 1964; McClelland,
1965; Emmons and McAdams, 1991; Pang, 2010; Rheinberg
and Engeser, 2010; Schultheiss and Strasser, 2012). Similarly,
recent advances in neurobiology have also begun tomove beyond
classic approach/avoidance interpretations of motivation, which
have been prevalent in the field of biology, enriching it with
a more motive-related vocabulary such as power-status (e.g.,
Eisenegger et al., 2011; Terburg and van Honk, 2013), affiliation
(e.g., Feldman, 2012) and care (e.g., Alcaro and Panksepp,
2011; Valk et al., 2017). Finally, behavioral game theorists
(e.g., Camerer, 2003), social dilemma researchers (Dawes, 1980;
Kollock, 1998; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; van Lange et al.,
2013) and neuroeconomists (Glimcher et al., 2013) have also
documented that humans often pursue ends other than the
maximization of their own payoff in economic interactions
(Frank, 1988; Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, 2004), and have, for
example, incorporated status-related or altruistic preferences in
utility functions to characterize such behaviors (e.g., Loewenstein
et al., 1989; Robson, 2001; Sally, 2001; Fehr and Fischbacher,
2003; Fehr et al., 2013).
To lay the grounds of an integrated motive-based framework
for decision making, we first reviewed the literature in the
domains of motivation psychology, neurobiology as well as
behavioral economics. This review is summarized in Table 1.
Based on this review, we converged on a preliminary set of six
motives that pertain to motivation psychology or neurobiology
and that are likely relevant for economic decision making:
achievement, power-status, affiliation, care, threat avoidance
(anger), threat approach (fear). In addition, moving from
economics toward psychology, consumption is proposed as an
exploratory seventh motive in psychology to potentially parallel
the benchmark form of utility typically used in economic
research. Of these seven preliminary motives, power, affiliation
and achievement are classic well-known motives in motivation
psychology (Table 1), whereas power and affiliation have also
more recently begun to be studied in neurobiological research.
Fear (or threat avoidance) and anger (threat approach) are
prominent in bothmotivation psychology and neurobiology, care
is a term used mostly in neurobiology (Table 1).
Naturally, the short review summarized in Table 1 is far
from exhaustive and the list of seven preliminary motives is
unlikely conclusive either. Yet, these motives have been identified
to be relevant for the three fields of interest reviewed here
and should provide sufficiently important and diverse stepping-
stones from which in future research on other related motives
could be investigated. Rather than justifying the selection of these
particular set of motives, the aim of this work is 2-fold: first, we
aim to investigate how these seven relevant motives are related
to each other—which of these motives are conceptually and/or
experientially similar or different to each other? Which emerge
together and which are rather antagonistic to each other? Second,
we aim at providing a database of motive-specific words that may
be used in future studies to more specifically probe the role of
distinct motives in economic decision making.
To achieve these two goals we conducted two studies.
First, we follow seminal efforts in the emotion literature (e.g.,
Russell, 1980) and investigate the semantic relations of the
seven identified motives. We do so by asking whether and
how subjects coherently differentiate between these motives in a
semantic categorization task. By applying principle component
analysis to such categorization judgments, we then further
explore which dimensions might allow them to do so. In
a second study, we assess whether the observed semantic
inter-relations hold at the level of subjective experience, that
is, whether semantically “close” motives are also more likely
to co-occur in subjectively reported experience. In what
follows, we begin by briefly introducing the seven motives
of interests. We then pass to describing the two empirical
studies and conclude by providing a database of motive-
specific words.
Motives in Motivation Psychology
Three motives, namely, “achievement,” “power,” and “affiliation”
are among the most recognized motives in motivation
psychology (Weiner, 1990). Achievement has been defined
as the desire to do something better or more efficiently
than before (McClelland et al., 1953; Atkinson and Feather,
1966; Weiner, 1990; Heckhausen and Heckhausen, 2010)
or as “the need to feel that one is making progress toward
important and/or long term goals” (Apter et al., 1998, p. 9).
A power and/or status-seeking motive can be understood
as the desire to have an impact (Fodor and Riordan, 1995;
Schultheiss and Brunstein, 2010), to be strong, to influence
others (McClelland et al., 1953; Reiss, 2004; Heckhausen
and Heckhausen, 2010). It has also been described as “the
need to be in control of objects, situations and events, to
dominate people” (in Apter’s “autic mastery,” Apter et al., 1998,
p. 9). Affiliation has been defined as the need to be liked or
the need to belong (Murray, 1938; McClelland et al., 1953;
Jackson, 1974; Baumeister and Leary, 1995; Heckhausen and
Heckhausen, 2010), and many have distinguished this from
a Care related motive, which is rather related to accepting
and nourishing others. For instance, Murray (1938) contrasts
nurturance and affiliation, McAdams (1980) distinguishes
an intimacy motivation from affiliation, Heckhausen (2000)
discriminates affiliation vs. altruism/help, Jackson (1974)
distinguishes between affiliation and nurturance, Apter et al.
(1998) differentiates between autic sympathy (“the need to be
admired, to be attractive to others, popular or loved,” p. 9)
and alloic sympathy (“the need to care for, nurture, give to
others, to enjoy the pleasure others receive from this,” p. 9), and
Schwartz’s system of universal values distinguishes benevolence
and universalism from conformity (Schwartz and Boehnke,
2004).
In addition to classical motives such as achievement, power
and affiliation discussed in motivation psychology, many have
advocated a motivational threat system encompassing fear and
anger. For example, fear-related motives have been described
as harm avoidance (Murray, 1938), avoidance (Thorndike,
1898; Lewin, 1935; Hull, 1943), fear (H. Heckhausen, 1989),
anxiety (Trudewind, 2000), security (Schwartz and Boehnke,
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Hedonism (Schwartz and Boehnke,
2004)
Wanting/appetitive; desire—seeking; foraging
(Berridge and Robinson, 1998; Depue and
Collins, 1999; Ikemoto and Panksepp, 1999;
Lea and Webley, 2006; Panksepp, 2006;
Alcaro et al., 2007; de Waal, 2007; Schultz,
2007; Delgado et al., 2008; Berridge et al.,
2010)
Lust and play (Nelson and Panksepp, 1998;
Panksepp, 2005; Alcaro and Panksepp, 2011)
Utility (Samuelson, 1938; Stigler and Becker, 1977)
In experimental economic settings, a benchmark utility
function is frequently assumed to depend only on
monetary or material payoffs (Camerer, 2003)
Speculative psychological and neurobiological
correspondents of such a benchmark interpretation of
utility are presented on the left side of this row
Care Intimacy (McAdams, 1980)
(Weinberger et al., 2010)
Nurturance (Murray, 1938;




Idealism and family (Reiss, 2004)
Compassion (Weinberger et al., 2010)
Alloic sympathy (Apter et al., 1998)
Benevolence (Schwartz and
Boehnke, 2004)
Care (Nelson and Panksepp, 1998; Panksepp,
2005; Alcaro and Panksepp, 2011)
Maternal love/parental care (Bartels and Zeki,
2004; Strathearn et al., 2009)
Loving-kindness and compassion (Klimecki
et al., 2012, 2014; Weng et al., 2013; Engen
and Singer, 2015; Bornemann et al., 2016;
Hildebrandt et al., 2017; Valk et al., 2017)
Trust (Bos et al., 2012; Boksem et al., 2013)
Altruism (Hamilton, 1964; Becker, 1974; Palfrey and
Rosenthal, 1988; Andreoni, 1990; Bruce and Waldman,
1990; Sally, 2001; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003)
Generosity in GTPs and charitable donations (Harbaugh
et al., 2007; Small and Lerner, 2008; Eimontaite et al.,
2013; Polman and Kim, 2013; Böckler et al., 2016;
Tusche et al., 2016)
Trust in GTPs (Kosfeld et al., 2005; Baumgartner et al.,
2008; Singer and Steinbeis, 2009; Böckler et al., 2016;
Chierchia et al., 2017)
Cooperation in GTPs (Batson and Moran, 1999; Batson
and Ahmad, 2001; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Small
and Lerner, 2008; Eimontaite et al., 2013; Polman and
Kim, 2013; Chierchia et al., 2017; Bartke et al., 2019)
Decreased punishment in GTPs (Batson and Ahmad,
2001; Singer and Steinbeis, 2009; McCall et al., 2014;
Kirk et al., 2016)
Affiliation Need to be liked or the need to
belong (Murray, 1938; McClelland
et al., 1953; Jackson, 1974; Weiner,
1990; Baumeister and Leary, 1995;
Heckhausen and Heckhausen, 2010)
Autic sympathy (Apter et al., 1998)
Conformity (Schwartz and Boehnke,
2004)
Social bonding (Carter, 1998; Insel and Young,
2001; Ross and Young, 2009; Gordon et al.,
2011; Feldman, 2012; McCall and Singer,
2012; Bakermans-Kranenburg and van
Ijzendoorn, 2013; Rilling, 2013)
(Fear of) social rejection (Eisenberger et al.,
2003; Eisenberger, 2012)
Tend and befriend (Taylor, 2006)
Norm compliance, social influence and peer
influence (Spitzer et al., 2007; Klucharev et al.,
2009; Chein et al., 2011; Zaki et al., 2011;
Izuma and Adolphs, 2013; Ruff et al., 2013;
van Hoorn et al., 2016)
Social identity influence economic outcomes (Akerlof and
Kranton, 2000)
Norm-based cooperation and punishment in GTPs (Fehr
and Fischbacher, 2004; Carpenter and Matthews, 2009;
Fehr and Schurtenberger, 2018)
Ingroup cooperation and outgroup punishment in GTPs
(Bernhard et al., 2006; Balliet et al., 2014; Yamagishi and
Mifune, 2016)
Increased generosity in GTPs in response to social
evaluation cues (Hoffman et al., 1996; Takahashi et al.,
2007; Ekström, 2012; von Dawans et al., 2012; Winking
and Mizer, 2013)
Conformism in GTPs and economic decision making
(Shang and Croson, 2009; van Hoorn et al., 2016;
Charness et al., 2019; Dimant, 2019)
Power—Status Power/status-seeking (Weiner, 1990;
Schwartz and Boehnke, 2004)
Having impact (Fodor and Riordan,
1995; Schultheiss and Brunstein,
2010)
Being strong and influencing others
(McClelland et al., 1953; Reiss, 2004;
Heckhausen and Heckhausen, 2010)
Agency/Power (Diehl et al., 2004;
Abele et al., 2008)
Competition/dominance (Wingfield et al., 1990;
Mazur and Booth, 1998; Salvador, 2005;
Burnham, 2007; Eisenegger et al., 2010, 2011;
Hall et al., 2010; Stanton et al., 2011; Apicella
et al., 2015; Reimers and Diekhof, 2015;
Dreher et al., 2016; Carré and Archer, 2018;
Bird et al., 2019)
Status and power concerns (Frank, 1985; Cole et al.,
1992; Robson and Samuelson, 2011)
Punishment in GTPs (Straub and Murnighan, 1995;
Yamagishi et al., 2012; Gordon and Lea, 2016; Chierchia
et al., 2017)
Status/image-based cooperation and generosity or
withdrawal from cooperation in GTPs (Wedekind and
Milinski, 2000; Hardy and Van Vugt, 2006; Lammers
et al., 2008; Kumru and Vesterlund, 2010; Guinote et al.,
2015)
Risk taking (Anderson and Galinsky, 2006; Apicella et al.,
2015)
Impatience in temporal discounting (Joshi and Fast,
2013)
Achievement Achievement/being better or more
efficient than before (McClelland
et al., 1953; Atkinson and Feather,
1966; Weiner, 1990; Schwartz and
Boehnke, 2004; Heckhausen and
Heckhausen, 2010)
Neurobiological research on
achievement-related behaviors remains sparse
Pursuing subjective goals and striving for success
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Selten, 1998; Gilboa and
Schmeidler, 2001; Gómez-Miñambres, 2012)
(Continued)
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TABLE 1 | Continued
Psychology Neurobiology Economics
Agency/Achievement (Diehl et al.,
2004; Abele et al., 2008)
Competence (Fiske et al., 2007;
Cuddy et al., 2008)




1972; Heckhausen, 1989; Carver and
Harmon-Jones, 2009)
Harm avoidance (Murray, 1938)
Avoidance (Thorndike, 1898; Lewin,
1935; Hull, 1943)
Anxiety (Trudewind, 2000)
Security (Schwartz and Boehnke,
2004)
Fear/Threat avoidance (Nelson and Trainor,
2007; Siever, 2008; Rodrigues et al., 2009;
Bond and Wingrove, 2010; Potegal and
Stemmler, 2010; Adolphs, 2013; Barrett and
Russell, 2014)
Fear/panic (Nelson and Panksepp, 1998;
Panksepp, 2005, 2006; Alcaro and Panksepp,
2011)
Punishment/reinforcement learning (O’Doherty
et al., 2001; Dayan and Balleine, 2002;
Montague et al., 2004; Schultz, 2007; Seymour
et al., 2007; Rangel et al., 2008; Seymour and
Dolan, 2008; Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010;
Lang and Bradley, 2010; Dayan and Berridge,
2014)
Risk aversion, loss aversion and ambiguity aversion
(Raghunathan and Pham, 1999; Lerner and Keltner,
2001; Maner and Gerend, 2007; Porcelli and Delgado,
2009; de Martino et al., 2010; Hartley and Phelps, 2012;
Canessa et al., 2013; Schulreich et al., 2016)
Anger/Threat
approach





Anger/Threat approach (Nelson and Trainor,
2007; Siever, 2008; Rodrigues et al., 2009;
Bond and Wingrove, 2010; Potegal and
Stemmler, 2010; Adolphs, 2013; Barrett and
Russell, 2014)
Rage (Nelson and Panksepp, 1998; Panksepp,
2005, 2006; Alcaro and Panksepp, 2011)
Punishment in GTPs (Pillutla and Murnighan, 1996;
Andrade and Ariely, 2009; Seip et al., 2014; Gummerum
et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2016)
Withdrawal from cooperation in GTPs (Dunn and
Schweitzer, 2005; Polman and Kim, 2013; Motro et al.,
2016)
Risk taking (Raghunathan and Pham, 1999; Lerner and
Keltner, 2001; Fessler et al., 2004; Tsai and Young, 2010;
Kugler et al., 2012; Ferrer et al., 2017; She et al., 2017)
GTPs, game theoretical paradigms.
2004), while anger-related motives have been characterized
as aggression (Heckhausen, 1989), negativism (Apter et al.,
1998), rage (McDougall, 1932; Panksepp, 2006), and vengeance
(Reiss, 2004). Naturally, fear and anger also bare the names of
primary emotions, though emotion researchers have frequently
highlighted their motivational components (Roseman, 2011, calls
them “emotivations”) and related them to “threat approach” and
“threat avoidance” (Carver and Harmon-Jones, 2009). Finally,
the optimization of one’s own utility and welfare, which plays
a prominent role in economics, is often operationalized as
the self-interested accumulation of goods (e.g., as monetary
payoff in behavioral economics settings). This has no clear
correspondent in psychology (but see Kasser, 2006; Kasser et al.,
2014). However, a possibly related motivational value called
hedonism has been suggested by Schwartz and Boehnke (2004),
and defined as “pleasure or sensuous gratification for oneself
(pleasure, enjoying life, self-indulgent)” (p. 239). Moreover,
a consumption motive has also been associated with terms
such as wanting, desire-seeking, or foraging and ownership
(McDougall, 1932), especially in the animal and neurobiological
literature (Berridge and Robinson, 1998; Depue and Collins,
1999; Ikemoto and Panksepp, 1999; Lea and Webley, 2006;
Panksepp, 2006; de Waal, 2007; Delgado et al., 2008; Berridge
et al., 2010).
A Semantic and Subjective Atlas of Seven
Motives
As a first step toward investigating the relations between these
motives, we conducted a semantic categorization task in which
we asked subjects to ascribe a number of motive-related words to
the seven motivational categories posited above. This approach
draws from a tradition of psychological studies on emotions that
assesses subjects’ conceptualization of affective states (Kuppens
et al., 2013, for a review). For instance, in a seminal paper,
Russell (1980) asked subjects to categorize 28 emotion-related
words to pre-defined emotional categories and found that 2
dimensions, namely valence and arousal, could predict most
categorization judgments (see also Posner et al., 2005; Kuppens
et al., 2013). In line with this, many psychologists (e.g., Shaver
et al., 1987; Barrett, 2004) have capitalized on categorization
agreements/disagreements to spatially represent “closeness” of
emotion-related concepts on a single (multidimensional) space.
To our knowledge, these approaches have frequently been applied
to emotions, but not to the motives addressed here.
Importantly, Russell (1980) argues that the cognitive structure
of emotions should reflect the structure of actually experienced
emotions, but this needn’t always be the case. For instance,
compassion tends to be prototypically conceptualized as
a positive emotion, though when experienced (e.g., when
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observing a suffering other) it can be accompanied by positive
as well as negative affect (Condon and Feldman Barrett, 2013).
We thus asked whether the conceptual-semantic proximity of
motives could predict their experienced proximity (e.g., an
increased likelihood of co-occurrence)? To answer this question,
in a second study, we asked participants to rate how well the
motives of interest described their currently (spontaneously)
experienced motives and feelings.
In terms of the expected relations between these motives,
achievement and power are likely to be related, as are affiliation
and care. In fact, a long standing tradition places power and
achievement-related constructs within an “agency” dimension
of behavioral orientation (which refers to a person’s striving to
be independent, to control one’s environment, and to assert,
protect and expand one’s self), sometimes with achievement-
related states on one end of this hypothetical agency spectrum,
and power-related states on the other (Bakan, 1966; Diehl
et al., 2004; Abele et al., 2008). The same tradition incorporates
care and affiliation-themed constructs within a “communion”
dimension (which refers to a person’s striving to be part of
a community, to establish close relationships with others, and
to subordinate individual needs to the common good) (Bakan,
1966; Camille et al., 2004; Abele et al., 2008) and has frequently
illustrated a gradient within this dimension, spanning notions
related to care, on one side, to those related to “lack of
independence” (i.e., affiliation), on the other (Abele et al., 2008).
Similarly to this agency/communion tradition, Apter et al. (1998)
proposes the meta-motivational distinction between mastery,
which encompasses elements of power and achievement, and
sympathy, which includes affiliation and care-themed states.
Furthermore, Schwartz’s system of universal values also finds that
conformity and benevolence are contiguous values, in that their
pursuit is not mutually exclusive, as is the case for power and
achievement (Schwartz and Boehnke, 2004).
Second, we expected that words attributed to affiliation would
have more conceptual proximity to fear, as research on affiliation
has made a link between the need to belong and fear of rejection,
social pain and separation distress (Panksepp, 2006; Weinberger
et al., 2010; Eisenberger, 2012). In contrast, we also expected
words related to care to be relatively farther from fear, since
research on empathic concern distinguishes between care-related
motives and negatively valenced states such as empathic distress
(Batson et al., 1983, 1987).
Third, we expected words related to threat approach (i.e.,
anger) and threat avoidance (i.e., fear) to be relatively close. In
fact, both motives are typically associated with high arousal and
negative affect, and both are related to perceived threats (Lerner
et al., 2015). Moreover, as anger has been associated with feelings
of agency (e.g., approach or fight-related responses) (Carver
and Harmon-Jones, 2009), we expected it to be closer to power
and achievement than threat avoidance (typically associated with
avoidance or flight).
Finally, as consumption was thought of as a parallel to the
self-interested motivation traditionally assumed in economics,
we expected consumption-specific words to be relatively close to
agentic motives such as achievement or power/status and distant




Seventy nine participants (40 males, mean age = 32.4, SD
= 13) took part in the study over 10 experimental sessions.
Sessions were conducted in the computer lab of the Department
of Social Neuroscience at the Max Planck Institute in Leipzig,
Germany. Participants took part in the tasks from individually
shielded computer cubicles. Participants of sessions 1 through
6 (n = 38, 21 males, mean age = 41.3, SD = 18.2) took part
in the categorization task only (see below), while participants of
sessions 7 through 10 (n = 41, 20 males, mean age = 26.4, SD
= 3.8) additionally took part in the valence and arousal ratings
(after the categorization task). Each participant took part in only
one session and sessions were scheduled based on participant
availability over a 2-month period. Experimental protocols
were approved by local ethics committee (of the Medical
Faculty of the University of Leipzig, n. 090-15-090032015)
and all participants provided written informed consent for the
anonymized treatment of their data.
Word Pre-selection
To pre-select motive-related words to use in the categorization
task, we drew from a previously existing “free-association”
database (Nelson et al., 2004), which was created by requiring
participants to name the “first word that came to mind that
was meaningfully related or strongly associated to the presented
cue word.” This database provides over 72.000 “cue-associate”
pairs. To draw motive-related words from this database we
proceeded in two steps. First, for each of our motives, we
searched the database for one or two most closely related
words. We called these “anchor words.” Second, we searched
the database for adjectives that had been associated to the
anchor words in either the 1st or 2nd degree. For example, for
our care motive we selected among associates of the anchor
word “care” (1st degree), as well as among the associates of
these associates–2nd degree. For most of our motives, the
identification of anchor words was trivial. Specifically, we took
the word “care” as an anchor word for the care motive, the
word “power” for power-status, “fear and fearful” for threat
avoidance (i.e., fear), “anger/angry” for threat approach (i.e.,
anger) and “achieve/achievement” for achievement. Two of the
posited motives, namely, “affiliation” and “consumption,” did not
have obvious equivalents in the database. For affiliation we thus
chose the anchor words “friend/friendly,” while for consumption
we chose the anchor word “want.” After having obtained a
preliminary set of motive-associated words, we expanded this set
through online synonym vocabularies.
Semantic Categorization Task
The pre-selected words were then used in themain categorization
task of interest. Here, subjects were required to ascribe each word
to one of the seven motives posited by our framework. Visually,
participants were shown a list of candidate motive-related words
(in randomized order), on the left side of the screen, and seven
labeled “boxes” on the right (see Supplementary Figure 1). All
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box labels began with the phrase “motivated by. . . ” and ended
with one of the following: “. . . care for others,” “. . . the desire to
belong,” “. . . power,” “. . . achievement,” “. . . anger,” “. . . fear,” and
“. . . the desire for possession and consumption”1. Subjects were
then asked to drag and drop each word into one (and only
one) of the boxes. A list of 174 words was used in sessions
1 through 6. After session 6, finding that participants quickly
accustomed to the task and easily managed to complete it in
the allotted time, we increased the number of words to increase
our power. Specifically, participants of the remaining sessions
(sessions 7 through 10) assessed a longer list of 304 words.
With one exception (due to a programming error for the word
“gemein”=mean), all of the words used in the first list were also
used in the second. All participants assessed all of the words.
Valence, Arousal, and Frequency Scores
After the categorization task, participants of sessions 7 through
10 (n = 41) also rated each of the 304 words on two scales:
a valence scale and an arousal scale. Scales consisted of visual
analog scales, which could take values between 0 and 100 (in
Supplementary Table 1 we subtract 50 from the mean valence
and arousal scores, so that t-tests against 0 may suggest which
words are statistically high/low in valence or arousal). Valence
and arousal scales were altered relative to more commonly used
ones in emotion research (e.g., scales from 1 to 9) (Bradley
and Lang, 1999) to allow for greater variance in responses, for
consistency with the self-report scales of study 2 (see below)
and because we mainly intended to use such scales in a PCA
that standardizes all measures to eliminate scale-specific variance.
The instructions for the tasks were taken from Kanske and
Kotz (2010). English translations in Supplementary Table 1were
carried out by professional translators.
Analysis
We ran two types of analyses. The first searched for “motive-
specific” words, that is, words that were attributed more
frequently to one motive than any other. To obtain these, for
each word, we took the two categories in which the word
had been most frequently placed in and we then ran a chi-
square test to assess whether the resulting proportion could
be due to chance. If this test was significant (p < 0.05), this
indicates that assignment frequencies differed between the most
popular and second-most popular categories (and thus also
between the most popular category and the third-most popular
category, the fourth-most popular etc.). We considered words
surpassing this test to be “motive-specific,” because they were
more frequently assigned to one category than any other, and
we took words to be “ambiguous” otherwise. P-values were
also corrected for multiple comparisons (using the Hochberg
method). In Supplementary Table 1, we append an asterisk to
the words that survived this more stringent criterion. This could
be considered a statistical parallel to Russell’s “precision” (which
took a value of 0, if a given word was distributed randomly
1For sessions 6 through 10, we slightly changed the label of this category to
“motivated by wanting.” We did so to control for a possible overly negative
connotation of the words consumption and possession. This label change led to
no identifiable difference in the results.
over the provided categories, and 1, if all subjects attributed
a given word to the same category) (Russell, 1980). Second,
we ran a principle component analysis (PCA) taking the seven
motivation-categories as variables/descriptors, and the single
words as items. The PCA was conducted with the PCA function
of the “Factominer” package (Lê et al., 2008) in R (R-Core-
Team, 2014). The PCA was based on the correlation matrix
of the standardized variables and it used unrotated principle
components. As supplementary variables of interest we took:
(i) the results of the first analysis (namely, a vector indicating
which motive—if any—each word had been specifically ascribed
to); and (ii) valence and arousal scores. Supplementary variables
enable to relate variables to PCA space, without affecting its
solution (Lê et al., 2008).
Results
Motive Specific Words
For each one of the tested motives, we found a subset of words
that significantly (p < 0.05) differentiated this motive from each
of the other presented motives. This was observed for 213 (70%)
of the 304 words and an average of 30 words (SD = 8.28) per
motivational category. This suggests that participants displayed
on which words best characterize each of the seven distinctions
we proposed. The “motive-specific” words are presented in the
database (Supplementary Table 1). Within each motivational
category they are ordered based on how frequently they were
placed in that category.
Semantic Closeness of Seven Motives
To explore the relative “semantic distance” between motives
we ran a PCA on the categorization judgments. The Kaiser
rule suggested retaining the first 2 components (as these had
eigenvalues higher than unity) of the PCA. The first component
explained 25.7% of the categorization variance, the second 18.7%,
for a total of 44.4%. The 1st component most clearly separated
between affiliation, care and fear, on the one side, and power,
achievement, and consumption on the other (all scores were
below −0.3 and above 0.3, respectively). The 2nd component
distinguished between anger and fear, on the one side, and care,
consumption and achievement on the other (all scores above 0.4
and below −0.3, respectively) (see Figure 1, left). With regard
to the supplementary valence and arousal variables, valence was
correlated to both the PCA components, but more strongly to
component 2 (r = 0.54, p < 0.001), while arousal was not clearly




Participants (n = 310, mean age = 27.19, sd = 5.97, females
= 163, males = 147) were recruited via email through the
Max Planck participant database to take part in two separate
studies on economic decision making (Chierchia et al., 2017,
2021). Those studied required a larger sample size than study 1,
yet they provided a good opportunity to test these hypotheses
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FIGURE 1 | A semantic and subjective atlas of seven motives. (Left) A semantic atlas of seven motives. Principle component analysis (PCA) of a word categorization
task in which participants were to assign words (points) to 1 of 7 motivational categories (arrows). Dots depict words more frequently attributed to one motivational
category than any other (p < 0.05) are surrounded by 95% confidence ellipses. Words that did not have this property are labeled “ambiguous.” They were included in
the PCA analysis but are not depicted (i.e., in white) to reduce visual clutter. Blue arrows represent how the valence and arousal of all words related to the PCA space.
(Right) A subjective atlas of seven motives. Principle component analysis (PCA) of a self-report task in which participants were to rate on a visual analog scale how
well a number of motive-specific words obtained in the first study described their spontaneously experienced motives and feelings at that moment.
as well. The higher sample size of study 2, is thus just a by-
product of this incidental annexation. As soon as participants
were welcomed to the experimental sessions, and thus before
being introduced to any of the experimental activities of interest
for those studies, they took part in the task described below.
Assessments were approved by the Research Ethics Committee
(agreement number 090-15-09032015) of the University of
Leipzig, Germany. All participants provided written informed
consent for the anonymized analysis of their data. We report all
measures, manipulations, and exclusions in these studies, though
no participants were excluded from the analysis.
Procedures
Participants were provided with a list of words and for
each one, they were asked to rate in how far they felt
“currently driven by these motivations, feelings or states,”
on a continuous visual analog scale ranging −350 to 350
(numbers were not visible to participants). These novel
questionnaire items probed the seven motives of interest
and were taken from the motive-specific words individuated
in study 1, above. Specifically, the fear-related items were
“apprehensive,” “afraid,” “timid,” “nervous,” “panic-stricken,”
“overcautious,” “frightened,” “reserved”; the anger-related
items were “aggressive,” “angry,” “offended,” “irritable,”
“argumentative,” “tempestuous,” “spirited,” care-related items
were “caring,” “protective,” “kind-hearted,” “cordial,” “helpful,”
“affectionate,” “sympathetic,” and “consoling”; power-related
items were “mighty,” “dominant,” “authoritarian,” “firm,”
“influential,” “condescending,” and “officious”; achievement
items were “hard-working,” “industrious,” “capable,” “efficient,”
“ambitious,” “success-driven,” “obstinate,” “productive”;
affiliation-related items were “entertaining,” “ingratiating,”
“excluded,” “conventional,” “attached,” “obliging,” “popular”;
and consumption items were “consumerist,” “hoarding,”
“avaricious,” “greedy,” “materialistic,” “cheap,” “pleasure-
seeking,” “acquisitive,” “desire to buy,” “gluttonous.” In addition
to these motive-related constructs, affect was measured by asking
participants to provide ratings on a number of items related
either to happiness (“content,” “happy,” “overjoyed,” “pleasant,”
“enthusiastic”) or sadness (“sad,” “downcast”). Overall, the
questionnaire consisted of 63 items. The order of the items was
fully randomized for each participant, who viewed seven items
per page.
Analysis
The ratings on items related to each motive displayed acceptable
internal reliability: fear (Cronbach’s α = 0.87), anger (α = 0.83),
power (α = 0.86), care (α = 0.92), achievement (α = 0.88),
affiliation (α = 0.67), consumption (α = 0.84). We thus first
ipsatized the ratings for each subject and then aggregated over
the items related to eachmotive. This resulted in 7motive-related
and 2 affect-related measures, for each participant. As for study
1, we then subjected these measures to principle component
analysis, focusing on the seven motive-related measures as
variables of interest and using the two affect measures as
supplementary variables. As we aimed to establish whether the
dimensions that explain the most variance at the semantic level
(as investigated in study 1) also do so at the subjective level (as
investigated here), we focused on the first two components of the
PCA solution.
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Results
Subjective-Experiential Closeness of Seven Motives
Taken together, the first two components of a PCA solution
explained 51.6% of the seven spontaneously occurring motives
of interest, as measured by ratings on a visual analog scale
(Figure 1, right). The first of the components (which explained
29.8% of the total variance) most clearly differentiated between
fear, anger and consumption on the one hand (all scores
> 0.56) and achievement and care on the other (scores <
−0.50). The second component (which explained 21.8% of
total variance) differentiated between more clearly between
care and affiliation on the one end (both scores < −0.56),
and power and achievement on the other (scores > 0.35).
As for the supplementary variables, happiness and sadness
were both (oppositely) related to the 1st dimension (with
scores respectively >0.54 and < −0.63), with the exception
of consumption, these dimensions clearly resembled those
individuated in study 1, as can be observed in Figure 1 where,
to facilitate comparability with the corresponding figure of
study 1 (Figure 1, left), we plotted the 1st component (i.e., the
component that explained the most variance) on the y-axis and
the 2nd on the x-axis.
DISCUSSION
As a first step toward a motivation-based decision making
framework that integrates psychology, neurobiology and
behavioral economics, the main goal of the present paper was
to investigate how seven relevant motives that have consistently
recurred in one or all of these reviewed fields relate to one
another, both on the semantic-conceptual as well as the
subjective-experiential level. This preliminary set of motives are
consumption/resource-seeking, care, affiliation, power-status,
achievement, threat avoidance, and threat approach. The second
goal of the present paper was to provide a word list of motives
that could be used in future experimental studies on the influence
of motives on economic decision making.
The analyses of a word-categorization task revealed that
subjects coherently differentiated between the seven motives,
as they agreed on which words were more related to one
motive as compared to any of the others. In spite of this,
participants disagreed more frequently on how to categorize
words to some motives more than others. This enabled to
obtain a spatial proxy of the relative conceptual overlap of
each of the tested motives (Figure 1, left). The 1st dimension
of the space differentiated between care, affiliation and fear
on one side and power, achievement and consumption on
the other. As anticipated, this separation is reminiscent of a
communion/agency distinction (Bakan, 1966; Diehl et al., 2004;
Abele et al., 2008), or a mastery/sympathy distinction (Apter,
1984; Apter et al., 1998), with care and affiliation words loading
on one side, and power, achievement and consumption loading
on the other. The 2nd dimension was partially related to valence
and especially differentiated threat approach, threat avoidance,
and power, on the one side, from care, affiliation, achievement
and consumption, on the other. These inter-relations amongst
motives were not only apparent in the semantic but also in the
subjective atlas.
In both atlases, we found that care and affiliation were
conceptualized and experienced as close but were differentiated
along a previously reported valence related gradient (Abele
et al., 2008) within the communion side of the space: most
of the negatively valenced communion-related words were in
fact attributed to the affiliation motive (e.g., “conventional,”
“excluded,” “attached/clingy,” “ingratiating,” “conformist” etc.),
while all but one care-specific word had positive valence (i.e.,
“pampering,” as opposed to “warm-hearted,” “soft-hearted,”
“motherly,” “kind,” “understanding” etc.). In line with this, many
positively valenced affiliation-specific words (e.g., “talkative,”
“affable,” “gregarious,” “communicative,” “sociable”) did not
survive correction for multiple comparisons, suggesting that,
as affiliation-related words become positive, they also become
more “conflated” with care. These results suggest that care
and affiliation are partially distinguished by valence. From a
more conceptual perspective we speculate that the distinction
between care and affiliation could also be related to the fact
that nearly all care-specific words clearly denoted other-oriented
motivation and behaviors, a motive to protect/help/accept others
(e.g., “selfless,” “generous,” “sacrificing,” “unselfish,” “helpful,”
“protective” etc.) while those related to affiliation expressed a
more self-focused need to be protected/helped/accepted or liked
by others (e.g., “clingy,” “popular,” “attached”). This is in line
with Apter’s distinction between alloic vs. autic sympathy, and
colleagues (1998), i.e., respectively, the motivation to nurture
and love others vs. the need to be loved. Such a view is also
compatible with the benevolence vs. conformity distinction in the
quasi-circumplex model of Schwartz and Boehnke (2004), where
benevolence is ascribed to the higher-order construct of “self-
transcendence”– values which “promote the welfare of others,
close and distant, and of nature” (p. 236)—while conformity is
ascribed to the higher-order construct of “conservation”—values
which “preserve the status quo and the certainty it provides
(security, conformity, tradition)” (see Schwartz and Boehnke,
2004, p. 236). Notably, Schwartz and colleagues find that, despite
this important distinction, conformity (i.e., affiliation in our
model) and benevolence (i.e., care) are relatively proximal, as our
data also suggests, despite noticeable methodological differences.
We also found that affiliation is semantically conceptualized
and subjectively experienced as closer to threat avoidance
(or fear) than care. Previous literature has frequently linked
affiliation to various negatively valenced states of social anxiety,
social exclusion or separation distress (Eisenberger et al., 2003;
Eisenberger, 2012). Moreover, a separate line of studies on
empathy for pain and altruistic behavior have shown that when
distress prevails over empathic concern, subjects tend to make
more self-protective and avoidant choices rather than altruistic
ones (Batson et al., 1983, 1987; Singer and Klimecki, 2014). Our
second finding could thus further qualify with our first one:
affiliation-related concepts may bemore negatively valenced than
care-related concepts, partly because the motive of affiliation
seems connected to the fear of separation and not belonging,
and thus being more closely connected to the motive of fear.
Similarly, in Schwartz and Boehnke’s (2004) multi-dimensional
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model of values (Schwartz and Boehnke, 2004), security and
conformity (analogs to our threat-avoidance and affiliation
motives) are immediate neighbors, and both belong to the higher-
order value of Conservation. In line with this, benevolence
(similar to our care motive) is more distant from security values
than conformity.
Moreover, and again similarly to Schwartz and Boehnke
(2004), we found that power-status and achievement-related
motives were also relatively close (as well as antagonistic to
care and affiliation). Indeed, Schwartz and Boehnke (2004)
propose that one higher-order value, self-enhancement [“to
enhance (. . . ) own personal interests even at the expense of
others,” p. 236], combines power and achievement [and forms
“a bipolar dimension with the higher-order type called self-
transcendence, that combines universalism and benevolence
values.” (p. 236)]. In line with this, power and achievement
have also been previously indirectly associated with agency
(Bakan, 1966; Diehl et al., 2004; Abele et al., 2008), which
has been suggested to span from positive aspects of agency
(such as “independence” and “achievement”), to more “excessive”
forms of agency, such as “hunger for power and superiority,”
culminating “in aggressive or rude behavior” (Bakan, 1966;
Diehl et al., 2004; Abele et al., 2008). This agency spectrum
appeared to be reflected in our motivational space as well,
with power/status-related words (e.g., “influential,” “dominant,”
“mighty,” “despotic” etc.) standing vertically between those
related to more positively valenced achievement (“determined,”
“success-driven,” “ambitious,” “motivated,” “capable,” “efficient,”
“competitive” etc.) and those related to anger (“aggressive,”
“hateful,” “hostile,” “argumentative” etc.). With regard to the
content of the two sets of words, it also appears that achievement-
specific words are more related to performance and seem only
“incidentally” social. For instance, among the achievement-
specific words, only the word “competitive” appears to imply
some social comparison, while most power-related words
more explicitly refer to dominance over others. Schematically,
achievement could be conceptualized as socially neutral, or a-
social, while power appears more frequently anti-social (van
Honk et al., 2016).
Our fourth hypothesis, also substantiated in the results, was
that threat approach and threat avoidance would be conceptually
close to one another. The proximity of these two motives
is in line with the notion that they can be considered as
two opposing response tendencies (approach vs. avoidance) to
perceived threats (Carver and Harmon-Jones, 2009). Indeed,
anger and fear-related states are generally both low in valence
and high in arousal, they are frequently experienced together
(Moons et al., 2010), and they have been frequently found to
cluster together in previous word sorting tasks (Russell, 1980;
Posner et al., 2005; Kuppens et al., 2013). Interestingly, even
though threat avoidance and threat approach both stem from an
over-arching threat system and may thus be characterized as two
sides of one coin, they can still be distinguished on the level of
behavior, affective states, physiological arousal and underlying
activation patterns (Stemmler, 2004; Stemmler et al., 2007).
In line with this, we find that threat approach and avoidance
display close spatial proximity, but are nonetheless distinct.
The multi-dimensional model of human values (Schwartz and
Boehnke, 2004) does not entail a motive or value similar to threat
approach. However, in the motivational style profile (Apter et al.,
1998), “negativism” (associated with acting provocatively and/or
reacting angrily to situations) is treated as part of the meta-
motivational oppositional modes of negativism vs. conformity.
Such an opposition implies that the respective motivational
modes are inherently antagonistic. Similarly, we find large spatial
distance between anger and affiliation (see Figure 1).
The only aspect on which the semantic and subjective atlases
diverged was with regard to our more exploratory consumption
motive. In both atlases, consumption was related to our alleged
“agency” dimension, however, in the semantic atlas, consumption
overlapped highly with achievement and less with power, while in
the subjective atlas it shifted away from achievement, and toward
threat approach/anger. Though unanticipated, we speculate that
this difference could be due to the fact that consumption-
oriented behaviors are frequently conceptualized as linked to
achievement (or perhaps even rationalized in the name of
achievement). Similarly, in the theoretical model of relations
among 10 motivational types of values (Schwartz and Boehnke,
2004), hedonism, which comes close to the consumption
motive suggested here, can be found in close neighborhood
to achievement. This proximity is in line with the notion that
self-interested maximization of profit or money is frequently
conceived as “an indicator of achievement, respect, and freedom
or power” (Lea and Webley, 2006, p. 170). However, at the level
of experience, it has also been suggested that the pursuit of
profit (i.e., consumption) can be used as a socially acceptable or
ritualized tool to express aggressive instincts (Behrendt, 2006),
and that anger can be a “hidden motivator” behind the desire to
buy products (Veling et al., 2011). Our finding that anger and
consumption are subjectively experienced but not semantically
conceptualized as close are in line with this notion, that anger
and consumptionmay share a subconscious link (Behrendt, 2006;
Veling et al., 2011). Furthermore, in the quasi-circumplex model
of the 10 motivational types of values (Schwartz and Boehnke,
2004), hedonism is situated opposed to benevolence. Similarly,
we find that care and consumption are spatially located on the
opposite sides of the atlases.
One question our pattern of results may raise is that much
literature has found communion and agency to be independent
dimensions rather than negatively related dimensions (e.g., Abele
et al., 2008). However, anti-correlated agency and communion
dimensions have also been reported. For example, Abele
et al. (2008) observe such an anti-correlation and suggest
this may be due to the fact that they chose words in order
to maximize the “separation” of the constructs of interest
(agency and communion in their case). This also applies to
our studies, and to study 2 in particular, given that the words
chosen for the subjective-experiential ratings were those that
maximally differentiated between motives in the categorization
task (i.e., participants were likely to assign those words to
one motivational category more than any other). Moreover,
as again suggested by Abele and colleagues, “the finding that
agency and communion are negatively related if valence is
controlled for is in line with previous research” (p. 1214, cursive
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ours). Our valence-related PCA dimension might have captured
valence-related variance, thus partially allowing such a negative
correlation of agency and communion-relatedmotives to surface.
Finally, it should also be noted that, even though not prominent
in the agency/communion literature, the antagonistic nature of
care/affiliation vs. power/achievement is more central in the
model of human values presented by Schwartz and Boehnke.
Here in fact, the closest value correspondents of these motives
(namely benevelonce/conformity vs. power/achievement) are
assigned to opposite ends of an explicitly bipolar higher-order
value construct, which separates between “Self-enhancement”
(the motivation to enhance own personal interests, even at
the expense of other) and “Self-transcendence” (the motivation
to promote the welfare of others, close and distant, and of
nature). Overall, this suggests that the negative relation of
agency and communion-related motives can be reconciled with
previous findings.
Finally, our sorting task also enabled to provide a list of
213 motive-specific words (Supplementary Table 1). Many of
these words corroborate existing questionnaire items related to
achievement, power, fear, anger and what we refer to as care
(Lefcourt, 1991; Buss and Perry, 1992; Costa and McCrae, 1992;
Lachman andWeaver, 1998; Abele et al., 2008; Spielberger’s State,
2010). In addition, our findings also suggest that some words
that have often been used in the literature may not be optimal to
disambiguate between certain motives. For instance, the words
“cordial” or “likable” are related to “warmth” in the NEO-PIR
but also to affiliation tendency by Mehrabian’s scale of Affiliative
Tendency (Mehrabian, 1994). Our results indicate that, when
confronted with the choice, participants indeed might associate
these words with care rather than with affiliation. Researchers
juxtaposing self-report measures to (economic) decision making
paradigms (Maner et al., 2002; Bosman et al., 2005; Ben-Shakhar
et al., 2007; Reuben and van Winden, 2008; Hopfensitz and
Reuben, 2009; Eimontaite et al., 2013) could use our motive-
specific words to better identify the motives underlying specific
decisions and investigate whether indeed such motives are
related to the corresponding decision patterns anticipated above
(Table 1). In fact, recent studies have already adopted a subset
of the motive specific words obtained here and found that they
can be simultaneously sensitive to corresponding motivational
inductions (e.g., of care, power, fear, or anger) and predictive
of economic behaviors of interest (Chierchia et al., 2017, 2021;
Bartke et al., 2019).
Future studies could use some of these words using spatial
arrangement methods (Richie et al., 2020), in which no pre-
existing categories are given and participants freely arrange
words on a screen, based on their perceived similarities (such that
words that are spatially closer are perceived to be more similar).
This would allow to compute semantic distances based on a
continuous measure rather than a categorical one. It would also
allow investigating whether our results hold—that is, whether
similar dimensions would differentiate between motives—when
no over-arching categories are provided at all. This would
provide further support to the notion that, much as in an atlas,
there could be a useful underlying coordinate system to help
navigate between important motives in economics, biology and
psychology: a dimension that distinguishes between agency and
communion on one side, and a positive and negative affect on
the other.
CONCLUSION
Integrating literature from motivation psychology, neurobiology
and behavioral economics, we propose that at least seven
distinct motives are likely to be crucial driving forces of
human decisionmaking: “consumption/resource seeking,” “care,”
“affiliation,” “achievement,” “status-power,” “threat approach,”
and “threat avoidance.” As a first preliminary investigation of
such a motivational taxonomy, we analyzed how participants
differentiate between these seven motives, and how such motives
are inter-related on a semantic-conceptual as well as subjective-
experiential level. We find that whereas care and affiliation are
close, affiliation is closer to threat avoidance (or fear) and could
thus refer to a more self-centered need to belong and to fear
of social exclusion, whereas care is more positively valenced
and could denote more altruistic orientation. On the other side
of both semantic and experiential atlases, we find achievement
overlapping highly with power, but with power lying closer
to threat approach (or anger). Together with these atlases, we
also provide a database of motive-specific words to be used in
future research linking motives to decision making. Overall, we
prospect a decision making model that goes beyond approach
and avoidance, that is psycho-biologically plausible, and that
highlights the importance of contexts in modulating motivation
(e.g., Bosworth et al., 2016). Such a model could justify policies
focusing on how institutions, contexts and frames can affect
motives, and possibly harness them to bolster cooperation.
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